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Irrealism, Ontological 
Pluralism, and the Trinity 
A Reply to Efird on 
Make/Believing the World(s) 
MARK S. McLEoD-HARRISON 
Department of Religious Studies 
George Fox University 
Newberg, Oregon 
In my Make/Believing the World(s) I argue that a version of irrealism 
holds, leading to a substantial ontological pluralism, all of which is compat-
ible with traditional Christianity. This irrealism requires the existence of a 
creator God, along with the creativity of humans. Call this irrealism cum 
ontological pluralism "theistic irrealism." The book goes on to argue that 
theistic irrealism is compatible with traditional Christianity. David Efird ar-
gues that if theistic irrealism is accurate, not only could Christians be irreal-
ists but that they should be, for theistic irrealism gives Christians the tools to 
solve the problem of identity among members of the Trinity. While Efird's 
suggestion is a generous one, and one that I would enjoy having as a result of 
my proposal, the theistically irrealistic traditional Christian should reject it. 
Here is why. Efird writes that the most promising way to deal with the 
logical problem of the Trinity 
is to reject the standard logic of absolute identity for a non-standard 
logic of relative identity, according to which apparent statements of 
identity, such as that the Father is the Son, are incomplete statements 
requiring the completion by a sortal, such as the Father is the same 
divinity as the Son. So, on this conception of identity, the Father is 
the same divinity as the Son but the Father is not the same person as 
the Son. On this conception and logic of identity, the doctrine of the 
Trinity is logically consistent. 1 
ABsTRACT: In response to my Make/Believing the World(s) , Efird argues that theistic irrealism 
provides the grounds for solving the problem of the Trinity. I argue that Efird is wrong so long as 
theistic irrealism is to remain consistent with traditional, orthodox Christianity. On his reading 
of theistic irrealism, the best he can provide is a modalis! version of the Trinity. 
1. David Efrid, review of Make/Believing the World(s), by Mark S. McLeod-Harrison, 
Analysis 71 (2011): 405. 
Dummett objects that relative identity entails that what quantifiers range 
over is "an amorphous lump of reality." This lump is then divided into things 
by choosing a particular criterion of identity. Efrid uses theistic irrealism to 
respond to Dummett's concern and to deal with the challenge of the Trinity. 
Efrid suggests that, given the framework proposed in Make/Believing 
the World(s) , sense can be made of the entailment of identity being relative 
to a sortal and hence the identity problem of the Trinity can be solved. He 
writes: 
Ontological pluralism rejects the picture on which reality is already 
articulated into distinct objects; rather, there are many realities, many 
worlds, which we create through our noetic achievements. These noet-
ic achievements will most certainly make use of sortals when we artic-
ulate the objects which make up the worlds. This might then suggest 
that according to one world, God is three, and according to another, 
God is one, depending on the sortal selected. Perhaps this is one way 
in which to argue that rather than being a modus tollens, Dummett's 
entailment is a modus ponens from Trinitarianism to noetic irrealism 
together with ontological pluralism.2 
Unfortunately, the grounds for this strategy are missing from and, in fact, 
cannot be constructed out of, theistic irrealism when combined with tradi-
tional Christian theism. 
On theistic irrealism, some things and some propositions are what Mi-
chael Lynch calls "virtual absolutes." An absolute full stop is a thing that 
exists or proposition that is true independent of all conceptual schemes 
("worlds" in the language of Make/Believing). A virtual absolute is a thing 
that exists or proposition that is true in every conceptual scheme (world). 
On theistic irrealism, there are no full stop absolutes. Nevertheless, there 
are some things that are what they are, and some propositions that are al-
ways true. It is just that they are what they are, or true, in a world. Yet some 
virtually absolute things have "thin" properties and those properties can be 
"thickened" up in various worlds in different ways. 
Now God, on theistic irrealism, is a virtual absolute. There is no well-
formed world, no well-formed conceptual scheme, in which God does not 
exist. The question is, what is the nature of that God? If traditional Christian-
ity is to be compatible with theistic irrealism, God must have the essential 
properties that God has according to Christianity. Now surely one of the 
essential properties of the Christian God qua Christian is the divine 's Trini-
tarian nature. So God is a Trinity in all worlds. How can that be, given the 
pluralism of theistic irrealism? Well, some things are virtual absolutes, and 
hence those things, qua the things they are, have properties that hold in all 
the worlds. That includes a thing's essential properties. So if the God at the 
2. Ibid. , 406. 
base of theistic irrealism is the Christian God, then that God is always a Trin-
ity in all the worlds. 
That does not entail that God is entirely fixed across worlds. Theistic ir-
realism argues that humans do contribute to God's very nature. We do so by 
"thickening" up God's thin properties, the latter of which are identified as the 
properties at the divine's core being. It is God's core being that holds across 
all worlds. But the Christian God is a Trinity and must be in all worlds. 
Hence God's being a Trinity is a thin property that obtains in every irrealistic 
world. To divide up God into "one" in one world and "three" in another but 
not one and three in any given world would be inconsistent with traditional 
Christianity. Of course, how the notion of "being a Trinity of persons but one 
essence" is thickened up is open to various possibilities. That is one of the 
strengths of theistic irrealism. But one of the possibilities is not that God is 
three in one world and one in another. God must be both in all, even if just 
thinly so. 
A case can be made that the God of theistic irrealism itself need not be 
the Christian God. Under those circumstances, God need not be triune. But 
the Christian God is triune. Hence, if theistic irrealism is to be compatible 
with traditional Christianity, the account of God must be triune. On Efird's 
suggestions we end up with a sort of (philosophically rooted) theological 
modalism (where God is not always the Father, Son, and Spirit but only 
sometimes) rather than the full-blooded Trinitarianism of orthodox Christi-
anity. 
If, on the other hand, the God who grounds theistic irrealism is taken to 
be a generic God-a God free of the peculiarities of the historic religions-
then perhaps for some Christians Efird's suggestions will work, for then we 
humans can construct God in Efird's more apparently consistent manner. But 
one gets a less than traditional Christianity should one take that route, for 
God is not always a Trinity but only if humans construct God to be thus. 
That is a little far distant from traditional Christianity. But even if God were 
thought of along those lines, it seems that the logical problem of identity in 
the Trinity does not go away. Even with a generic notion of God, that God 
must tum up in every noetically created world, for God is a virtual absolute. 
That God must have some properties the divine has across all worlds, even if 
thin ones. Surely one of the thin properties of a generic God would be one-
ness. But then in the world where humans make God a Trinity, God would 
still be one. And if one, then is not the Christian facing the paradoxes of the 
traditional account of the Trinity except limited to the "Christian" worlds she 
creates? God would be both one God and yet three distinct persons. 
Make/Believing the World(s) attempts to argue that there are good 
grounds for irrealism cum pluralism but then continues on to argue that God 
should be understood as central to any irrealism cum pluralism. It does not 
argue that that God must be the Christian God. However, there are arguments 
in the book that make the Christian God a very plausible candidate for the ul-
timate ground of being. Specifically those arguments explain God in terms of 
sociality and hence a Trinitarian account seems plausibly the best. Yet I think 
that showing that theistic irrealism is compatible with traditional Christian-
ity is the best that can be done. So although it would be nice to have solved 
the mystery of the Trinity, and to have a positive reason for the Christian qua 
Christian to become theistic irrealists, it seems that theistic irrealism cannot 
do the former and does not have the grounds for doing the latter. Not, at least, 
on the grounds laid out by Efrid. His kind suggestion should be rejected. 
